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KONRAD ADENAUER'S MILITARY ADVISORS

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<p>The question: Why did Konrad Adenauer appoint former Wehrmacht generals Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger as his military advisors? is used to examine the political relationships between the army officer corps, state, and society in Western-occupied Germany immediately following the Second World War, and to draw conclusions about the nature of the relationship between political and military power.</p> <p>This examination indicates long term socio-political rifts within the German Army Officer Corps, and shows that Adenauer's elevation of men from the faction represented by Speidel and Heusinger was part of the larger process by which elements of the Christian Democratic Union (Germany's conservative party) consolidated political power from 1945-1948.</p> <p>I further argue that Adenauer's actions were intertwined with and successful because of his faction's participation of postwar Western security policies, especially vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.</p>					
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KONRAD ADENAUER'S MILITARY ADVISORS

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of Cornell University

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of

Master of Arts

by

Jennifer René Pournelle

May, 1989

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ABSTRACT

This thesis poses the question: Why did Konrad Adenauer appoint former *Wehrmacht* generals Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger as his military advisors? The question is used to examine the political relationships between the army officer corps, state, and society in Western-occupied Germany immediately following the Second World War, and to draw conclusions about the nature of the relationship between political and military power.

To answer this question, I have considered historiography of the German postwar period; German twentieth-century military historiography; historical and sociological examinations of politico-military relationships in general; and political science analyses of postwar German domestic and foreign policy issues, especially as they relate to those of the Western occupying powers.

In the narrowest sense, I conclude that Adenauer picked these particular men to be his military advisors because they were technically competent and highly qualified; trusted by and acceptable politically to the United States, France, and key members of his own and the opposition political parties; and shared an interrelated set of political and moral convictions which were nearly identical to his own.

More broadly, I show that consideration of this shared world view reveals the socio-political basis of

long term rifts within the German army officer corps, and that Adenauer's elevation of men from the particular army faction represented by Speidel and Heusinger to positions of international prominence was part of the larger process by which West German liberal-democratic parliamentarians in general, and centrist elements of Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union in particular consolidated domestic political power. I further argue that these actions were part of a conscious effort on Adenauer's part to prevent politically reactionary elements of the ex-military from ever regaining political dominance, and show that this effort was both intertwined with and successful because of his faction's participation in the formulation of postwar Western security policies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Captain Jennifer R. Pournelle was born 1 May, 1955 in Seattle, Washington, and attended public schools in Washington, California, Louisiana, and Indiana. In 1977 she was awarded the Bachelor of Science degree (With Honor) from the Michigan State University Honors College, and thereafter continued graduate study of Anthropology.

Her work was interrupted by financial and family difficulties, and in 1978 she enlisted as a Medical Specialist in the United States Army. After completing Officer's Candidate School in 1979, she was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant, U.S. Army Military Intelligence.

Captain Pournelle's military education includes the Military Intelligence Officer's Basic and Advanced Courses; the Air Defense Officer's Advanced Course; the Image Interpretation (Tactical Surveillance) and Electronic Warfare Staff Officer Courses; and the Combined Arms and Staff Services School. She has served as a commander and staff officer in military intelligence, air defense, and artillery units with the XVIIIth Airborne Corps, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina and the Vth (U.S.) Corps, Federal Republic of Germany.

On completion of Cornell University's Master of Arts program in German Area Studies in February, 1989, she will begin aide-de-camp duties for the Joint Defense Delegate to the Conventional Stability Talks in Vienna, Austria.

DEDICATION

To the memory of Stephen

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J.R.P.

Ithaca, NY

January, 1989

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Organized support for and opposition to
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When they had entered Capernaum a centurion came up to ask his help. 'Sir,' he said, 'a boy of mine lies at home paralyzed and racked with pain.' Jesus said, 'I will come and cure him.' But the centurion replied, 'Sir, who am I to have you under my roof? You need only say the word and the boy will be cured. I know, for I am myself under orders, with soldiers under me. I say to one, "Go", and he goes; to another, "Come here", and he comes; and to my servant, "Do this", and he does it.' Jesus heard him with astonishment, and said to the people who were following him, 'I tell you this: nowhere, even in Israel, have I found such faith. Many, I tell you, will come from east and west to feast with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of Heaven. But those who were born to the kingdom will be driven out into the dark, the place of wailing and grinding of teeth.'

Then Jesus said to the centurion, 'Go home now; because of your faith, so let it be.' At that moment the boy recovered.

Matthew 8: 5-13
The New English Bible
Second Corrected Edition

INTRODUCTION

The German Army in Society and State Since 1945

It is difficult to compare the rearmament of Germany after 1949 to German rearmament after the Treaty of Versailles. It is also difficult to compare the role played by the Federal German Army (*Bundesheer*) within its parent society to that played by the armies of the *Wehrmacht* in the Third Reich, the *Reichswehr* in the Weimar Republic, or the Army of the Confederation in the Wilhelmian Empire. In all cases, *Stunde Null* (Zero Hour) intrudes.

Lurking behind *Stunde Null*--the idea that 8 May 1945 (the date of Germany's surrender after the Second World War) does or should or could represent a total break with the German past¹--are fears that the events leading to that fateful hour could be repeated, or that some of the persons responsible for those events could be either exonerated or indicted.² As a result, few historians

¹ Ulrich Albrecht, et.al. (Hg.), *Zusammenbruch oder Befreiung: Zur Aktualität des 8. Mai 1945* (Berlin, 1986).

² As has been debated *ad nauseum* by West German historians and politicians over the past half-decade in what has been termed the *Historikerstreit*. Konrad Jarausch misinterprets this 'discussion' as an intergenerational methodological dispute in "Removing the Nazi Stain? The Quarrel of the German Historians" (*German Studies Review*, May 88: 285-301). Richard J. Evans hits nearer the real heart of the problem: "For [West Germany's] position and reputation in the world, [whether Auschwitz was unique or not] is very relevant. This is, no doubt, why conservative historians in the Federal Republic are so anxious to deny [its] singularity...and to suggest that other nations have committed similar crimes." "The New Nationalism and the Old History:

have attempted to bridge this barrier between prewar and postwar Germany,³ and analytic categories such as "militarism" or "nationalism" have not been used to consider events preceding 1945 in the same way that they

Perspectives on the West German *Historikerstreit*" (*Journal of Modern History* Dec 87: 782). I would add that it is especially important for 'the position and reputation in the world' of West Germany's conservative political parties, who need continuing justification for the postwar decision not to rigidly pursue denazification or prosecution of 'lesser' war criminals. Further, for conservative pro-capitalists, it is necessary to show that Hitler's rise was not 'caused' by the financial backing he received from a powerful circle of investment bankers and heavy industrialists; for liberal social democrats, it is equally necessary to defend against the conservative charge that the Soviet Stalinist experience was 'caused' by 'Marxist-socialist materialism'. Michael Foot touches on this debate outside Germany in his tribute to A.J.P. Taylor ("Alan Taylor") in: *Warfare, Diplomacy, and Politics: Essays in Honor of A.J.P. Taylor* (London, 1986: 3-13).

³ Examples are legion. Of book-length works, three stand out in that they are otherwise indispensable treatments of postwar history as it relates to military policy. Among popular surveys targeting the educated but not scholarly reader, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Karl Dietrich Bracher, Hg.; Stuttgart, 1981) is noteworthy. Published in five volumes, it begins with Theodor Eschenburg's *Jahre der Besatzung: 1945-1949* and focuses on "the problem of the national and civic identity of the West German state" [David Gess, *Peace and Survival*; Stanford, 1985: 6] without considering pre-1945 tradition. In *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik* (Stuttgart, 1980), Hanz-Peter Schwarz considers the relationship of domestic economy to the development of foreign policy in Western-occupied Germany from 1945-1949. He does convincingly show 'constants of Konrad Adenauer's political world view' (pp. 423- 442) beginning in 1919, but the rest of his lengthy study is devoted solely to the occupation period. Among works which specifically consider security issues, Gerhard Wettig, *Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland* (München, 1967) derives Federal German security policy from that of allied and superpower politics beginning in 1941, but he does not consider domestic German security issues over the same period.

have been used toward events which follow it.⁴

These particular terms are in any case inconsistently or poorly defined, but when applied to German security policies and the German military, very often in addition they are muddled together.⁵ Because

⁴ On the changing definition of militarism and the problems of its use in historiography, see Detlef Vogel, "Militarismus--unzeitgemässer Begriff oder modernes historisches Hilfsmittel?" (*Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 1/86: 9-35, esp. pp. 22ff.), and Volker R. Berghahn, *Militarism: The History of an International Debate 1861-1979* (Leamington Spa, Warwickshire 1981). The related problem of the change in how 'militarism' is both defined and used before and after 1918 is addressed by Michael Geyer in his introduction to *Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit: Die Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolitik 1924-1936* (Wiesbaden, 1980: 1-15), and Geoff Eley, "Some thoughts on German Militarism" in: *Militär und Militarismus in der Weimar Republik*, Hg. v. Klaus-Jürgen Müller and Eckardt Opitz (Düsseldorf, 1978: 223-304). Louis L. Snyder, *Roots of German Nationalism* (Bloomington, 1978) is a good example of the redefinition of 'nationalism' following the 'clean break in history' after 1945 within a single work. Frank Ninkovich, *Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question Since 1945* (Boston: Twayne, 1988) deals with "The German Question since 1945" as a fuzzy blend of reunification, militarism, National Socialism, and nationalism. Kurt P. Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism Since 1945* (Middletown, 1967) similarly equates 'resurgent nationalism' with 'the anti-liberal tradition', rearmament, and 'resurgent National Socialism'. On recent problems associated with use of the concept of 'nationalism' in modern German historiography, see Evans, "The New Nationalism": 761-797.

⁵ Emil Oberman, *Soldaten, Bürger, Militaristen: Militär und Demokratie in Deutschland* (Stuttgart, 1958) commits all these errors. In *Der preussisch-deutsche Militarismus. Ein Kulturkomplex im sozialen Wandel* (Köln, 1984) Emelio Willems not only fails to adequately define militarism, but confuses it with rearmament. All the contributors to the May, 1977 *Beiträge eines internationalen Symposiums an der Hochschule der Bundeswehr Hamburg* (Müller and Opitz, *Militär und Militarismus*) consider this problem.

explanations for a constellation of issues on either side of 1945--'the German Problem', National Socialism, the Cold War, the Berlin Wall, 'the German Question', the Pax Atomica--also have been assembled around some admixture of 'militarism' and 'nationalism' (however defined),⁶ the German military is inevitably dragged into the mess. This tendency is especially prevalent in any discussion of the *Bundeswehr*.

The *Wehrmacht* was defeated, disarmed, and disbanded in 1945; the *Bundeswehr* was not activated until a decade later. It is therefore easy to limit an assessment of change in the politics of Germany's armed forces over the course of the twentieth century to a superficial argument that the *Bundeswehr* marks a total break with dangerous German military tradition.⁷ On the other hand,

"The first intake into the...*Bundeswehr*... consisted of more than 150,000 volunteers. There were 40,613 former officers of the *Wehrmacht*, 87,089 former NCO's and men and only some 10,000 who had no previous experience in

⁶ As is discussed vis-a-vis National Socialism by Juergen Kocka in "German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg" (*J. of Contemporary History*, 23:1 Jan 88: 3-16). See also Evans, "The New Nationalism". Marc Cioc explores the relationship among all these issues in: *Pax Atomica: The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era* (New York, 1988).

⁷ One of the earliest examples: Fritz Rene Allemann, *Bonn is Nicht Weimar* (Köln/Berlin, 1956: 368-410). Eric Waldman, *The Goose Step is Verboten: the German Army Today* (Glencoe, 1964) is another popular survey with little analytical value focusing on opinion polls and official statements.

the army. Of 38 generals, 31 had been in [Hitler's] general staff..."⁸

So it is equally easy to purport a specific kind of continuity: that the *Bundeswehr* is a dangerous resurrection of some previous German army.⁹ Both approaches largely skip over the decade from 1945-1955. Neither approach produces penetrating analysis.

All military institutions are systematically organized, giving them an outward appearance of uniformity. Furthermore, by design they enable whomever leads them to concentrate, mobilize, and exercise coercive force as an instrument of political power. As a result, their leadership--the officer corps--is often assumed to constitute *en bloc* both a polity and a political system.¹⁰ Its attitudes and actions are

⁸ Martin Kitchen, *A Military History of Germany from the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day* (Bloomington, 1975: 338).

⁹ John Laffin, *Jackboot: The Story of the German Soldier* (London, 1965) is a good example of this viewpoint sensationalized. Hajo Herbell, *Saat des Verderbens* (Berlin, 1961) provides it from the East German side. Kitchen's treatment (*A Military History*: 330-365) is more intelligent, but he does not distinguish between differing conservative traditions or demonstrate the mechanism of command authority, and therefore ultimately does not show the precise connections necessary to support his argument. The whole debate has been summarized neatly by Wilfred von Bredow: "It is not at all easy to get the information you want because it is frequently wrapped in lots of rubbish." Quoted from: "The Ordeal of Tradition in the German Militaries" in: *The Military, Militarism and the Polity: Essays in Honor of Morris Janowitz*, ed. by Michael Martin and Ellen McCrate (New York, 1984: 187-199).

¹⁰ A polity is a group of people constituted as a cohesive political body; this is a unitary definition. A political system is the method of such a constitution;

usually traced as if they were always those of a unified political party, with a predictable party line.¹¹ The Kapp Putsch of 1920, an example of differing army factions pledging loyalty to differing political factions, showed that this has not always been true, even in Germany.¹² Careful study of officer resistance to Hitler's regime has also shown officer corps factionalism along ideological lines.¹³ Whether these divisions are related, have continued, or have had significance after the war would be interesting to know in detail, for it is certainly true that the leadership of the German armies played a prominent role in twentieth-century German politics up to 1945, and that its position has been diminished since that time.¹⁴

this is a relational definition.

¹¹ Karl Demeter commits this error when he perfunctorily reviews the attitudes and social origins of officers of the armies of Saxony, Bavaria, and Württemberg and labels their deviations from the Prussian model as aberrant to "the natural run of things." *The German Officer-Corps in Society and State 1650-1945* (New York, 1965: 33).

¹² Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945* (London, 1955: 375-380).

¹³ Peter Hoffman's most recent work, "Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg in the German Resistance to Hitler: Between East and West" (*The Historical Journal* 31:3, 629-650), makes convincing arguments in this regard which will be further discussed later in this paper.

¹⁴ Craig, *Politics of the Prussian Army*; Demeter, *The German Army*; Kitchen, *A Military History*; Isabel V. Hull, *The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II 1888-1918* (New York/London, 1981); Eric Waldman, *Soldat im Staat: Der Staatsbürger in Uniform: Vorstellung und Wirklichkeit* (Boppard a. Rhein, 1963); Carl-Gero von Ilseman, *Die Bundeswehr in der Demokratie Zeit der Inneren Führung*

To discover how and why this happened, I have focused on the very particular role played by Konrad Adenauer's military advisors Adolf Heusinger and Hans Speidel during the years 1945-1949. These men are interesting for several reasons. First, Adenauer picked them at least a year before he became Chancellor in 1949, and they still enjoyed his favor upon his retirement.¹⁵ Second, they were the first two general officers sworn into the *Bundesheer* on its activation in 1955.¹⁶ Five years earlier, the Chancellor had made them responsible for its organization and manning,¹⁷ and both went on to long and distinguished *Bundesheer* and NATO careers.¹⁸ In this regard, their influence over military affairs outlived that of their patron. Finally, like his, their service spanned the decades and governments from *Kaiserreich* to *Bundesrepublik*--proving a survivability and adaptability that of itself demonstrates a continuity of some sort. The nature and meaning of that continuity is what we shall attempt to find.

(Hamburg, 1971).

¹⁵ Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer 1949-1957* (*Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Bd. 2; Wiesbaden, 1981: 298); Hans Speidel, *Aus unserer Zeit: Erinnerungen* (Berlin/Frankfurt a.M./Wien, 1977: 252 ff., 412 ff.).

¹⁶ Waldman, *Goose Step*: 97.

¹⁷ Walter Henry Nelson, *Germany Rearmed* (New York, 1972: 30).

¹⁸ Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer*: 526 and 532.

Why Did Konrad Adenauer Need Military Advisors?

Asking why Konrad Adenauer chose his military advisors is really a refinement of the more global question: Why was Germany rearmed? At the outset, not only did rearmament appear to be economically unfeasible, but opposition to such a course was broadly based and well organized.

Upon Germany's surrender in 1945, "transportation and communications were disrupted, factories were closed, credit institutions had ceased to function[;] economic life had apparently come to an end..."¹⁹ Specifically, North German harbors and the Rhein network waterways were choked with wreckage and rendered nearly inoperable by the destruction of docking facilities, dams, and locks. Transshipment stock was at a premium: 77% of barges, 68% of locomotives, and 27% of railroad cars were destroyed or required extensive repairs. The railways were additionally crippled by the destruction of 22% of all tracks and thousands of bridges. Attempts to cope efficiently with this chaos were hampered by virtual cessation of mail and telephone service.²⁰ Added to these woes, at a time when Germany desperately needed to conserve industrial capacity to repair lines of

¹⁹ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (New York, 1950): 185-186.

²⁰ *Ibid.*: 186-188.

communication, Allied pressures for extraction of war reparations led to the immediate onset of industrial dismantling.²¹ This additionally hampered the country's ability to produce export goods, and hence to procure foreign exchange credits.²² At the same time, the nation's coal production fell 60% below the 1938 level, and much of what was produced was diverted to Allied use, further limiting industrial production. With the onset of harsh winter weather and 50-80% of pre-war dwellings destroyed, the average citizen's daily caloric requirement went up at precisely the time when there was no heat, no organized construction industry, no coal for production of artificial fertilizers to boost agricultural output, no money to purchase scarce foodstuffs from abroad, and limited capacity to distribute what food was available. At the same time, refugees and expellees poured in from the East, eventually adding twelve million people to the population and swelling the ranks of the unemployed, who could not be put to work in idled and dismantled factories. The results were predictable: by fall of 1946, the mortality rate was up 35%; 50% of school-aged children had been exposed to tuberculosis; and Adenauer's medical statistician alleged a 62% drop in school performance, which he attributed to malnutrition. Hundreds of

²¹ Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs 1945-53* (Chicago, 1965): 58-59.

²² Clay, *Decision*: 196.

thousands suffered hunger edema, and average body weight among men and the elderly had dropped respectively to 13% and 20% below normal.²³

Under these conditions, it is not surprising that in 1950, when mention of the possibility of a German contribution to a West-bloc security force was first made public, outcry was immediate and virtually universal. There was no popular basis for rearmament in the profoundly war-weary population, which rallied to express its opposition to any notion of compulsory service in the so-called "Ohne Mich" (without me) movement.²⁴ Professional soldiers, angered by what they viewed as unfair scapegoating of their brethren at Nuremberg, refused to serve unless their reputations were rehabilitated.²⁵ The SPD feared that West German rearmament would jeopardize any hope of future German reunification, and Kurt Schumacher's vehement opposition on those grounds is well known.²⁶ Even within Adenauer's

²³ Adenauer, *Memoirs*: 58-63.

²⁴ A. J. Ryder, *Twentieth-Century Germany From Bismarck to Brandt* (New York, 1973): 502; Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer*: 119-126.

²⁵ Ryder, *Twentieth-Century Germany*: 503; Heinz-Ludger Borgert, Walter Stürm and Norbert Wiggershaus, *Dienstgruppen und Westdeutscher Verteidigungsbeitrag: Vorüberlegungen zur Bewaffnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Boppard a. Rhein, 1982).

²⁶ Udo F. Löwke, *Für den Fall, dass...Die Haltung der SPD zur Wehrfrage 1949-1955* (Hanover, 1969); Ryder, *Twentieth-Century Germany*: 496; Lothar Wilker, *Die Sicherheitspolitik der SPD 1956-1966: Zwischen Wiedervereinigungs- und Bündnisorientierung* (Bonn, 1977).

own coalition, the churches, sensitized by charges that they had not done enough to oppose Hitler's rise, were doubly concerned to resist rearmament on theological grounds. This sentiment ran so deep that Gustav Heineman, Adenauer's Interior Minister, resigned and quit the CDU, threatening to split the party.²⁷ The BHE (Refugee's and Expellee's Party) had the same fears as the SPD, and even FDP and right wing CDU banking interests were opposed: they did not believe that rapid economic recovery could continue if scarce steel and coal stocks were diverted into production of military materiel. Ironically, despite the influx of refugees, they were also dismayed by a shortage of men; apparently integration of women into armed services or the labor force was not considered, despite the successful American, British, and Russian wartime experience.²⁸ And the occupying Allies certainly had no support at home for any action perceived as boding a militaristic German revival.²⁹

The idea that rearmament could have been accomplished democratically in the face of such

²⁷ Ryder: 503; Johanna Vogel, *Kirche und Wiederbewaffnung: Die Haltung der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland in den Auseinandersetzungen um die Wiederbewaffnung der Bundesrepublik 1949-1956* (Göttingen, 1978); Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer*: 122.

²⁸ Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer*: 110-112 and 119-126.

²⁹ Ryder, *Twentieth-Century Germany*: 457; 502.

widespread opposition is so paradoxical as to appear impossible, and many have struggled to explain how it could have happened at all.. Badstübner's Marxist view is that capitalism leads inevitably to militarism, and hence to rearmament, although he does not then explain why rearmament was done in East Germany.³⁰ Similarly, Homze and Lider argue that a German military-industrial complex exists, which in the plodding pursuit of its own self-possessed interests never developed a conceptual framework to justify rearmament, but simply occupied itself with the practicalities of achieving it, producing an inevitable outcome. They do not, however, show why this outcome is inevitable.³¹ Albrecht claims rearmament was accomplished as the result of a coalition between the German military and a U.S. 'hardliner' faction;³² Allen similarly charges that Adenauer, his advisors, and John Foster Dulles (U.S. Secretary of State) were members of an international power elite which ruthlessly pursued its own program, irrespective of popular wishes.³³

³⁰ Rolf Badstübner, *Das Wiedererstehen des Militarismus in Westdeutschland (1945-1960) (Dokumente und Materiellen)* (Berlin, 1962).

³¹ Edward M. Homze, "The German MIC" in *War, Business and World Military-Industrial Complexes* ed. by Benjamin Franklin Cooling (London, 1981). Julian Lider, *Problems of Military Policy in the Konrad Adenauer Era (1949-1966)* (Helsinki, 1984).

³² Ulrich Albrecht, *Die Wiederaufrüstung der Bundesrepublik: Analyse und Dokumentation* (Köln, 1980).

³³ Charles R. Allen, *Heusinger of the Fourth Reich* (New York, 1963).

Kitchen provides a line of reasoning which brings these trains of thought together. He argues that in order to insure "that West Germany was fully integrated into the American-dominated anti-communist and capitalist bloc" Adenauer reinstalled the same industrial and military elite which was responsible for the rise of Nazism, and that rearmament was never perceived by them as a military necessity, but was done to win a place for Germany among the Western Powers. He states that "the remilitarization of Germany was the golden opportunity for those who were threatened by the general trend towards a thorough-going democratization of society, and was the keystone of the restorative policies of the post-war epoch."³⁴ Tauber agrees, identifies the war veterans used to staff the *Bundeswehr* as unrepentant *alte-Nazis*, and views their reinstatement as dangerous.³⁵ More sympathetically, Prittie argues that rearmament was the only means by which Adenauer's government could quickly reestablish German sovereignty.³⁶ Like the harsher critics of the far left, Calleo's more penetrating analysis does not see this, or 'German militarism' in general, as being different from Great Power politics anywhere.³⁷

³⁴ Kitchen, *A Military History*: 331.

³⁵ Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*.

³⁶ Terence Prittie, *The Velvet Chancellors: A History of Postwar Germany* (London, 1979).

³⁷ David Calleo, *The German Problem Reconsidered*

More recently, Fursdon argued that the failure of France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to resolve intractable domestic differences over the purpose of the proposed continental European Defense Community (France favoring a 'defense from Germany'; the Benelux favoring a 'defense from the Soviet Union') was the catalyst for U.S./U.K. entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This supposedly assuaged French fears sufficiently to cause that country to drop its objections to German rearmament. Implicit in this argument is the notion that a defensive alliance which included a rearmed West Germany was necessary, although he does not explain why.³⁸ Nelson had previously attributed these events to a triumph of a liberal-economist 'Europeanist' attitude, although with less attention paid to how this happened.³⁹ The extreme of this logic argues that West German integration into NATO was forced by international and especially U.S. pressure; Kaplan attempts to show that the Soviet threat was perceived as real by the U.S., who as a result saw West European integration into NATO as a necessity.⁴⁰

(London, 1978).

³⁸ Edward Fursdon, *The European Defense Community: A History* (New York, 1980).

³⁹ Nelson, *Germany Rearmed*.

⁴⁰ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951* (Washington, 1980).

Recent work challenges this notion by asserting that weaker nations, especially Great Britain, in fact exerted influence to overcome American hesitation toward entering the alliance.⁴¹

The most extreme position in support of West German rearmament holds that Soviet Russian expansionism made any other course unthinkable.⁴² As early as 1966, Richardson argued that contemporary Western opinion greatly exaggerated the importance of adventurism and irredentism in Germany, and equally underestimated German concern for external security.⁴³ Recent work defends the view that many West German decision-makers did perceive the Soviet threat as real, and that their security concerns were genuine.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Nicholas Henderson, *The Birth of NATO* (Boulder, 1983); Jürgen C. Hess and Friso Wielenga, "Die Niederlande und die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands: Ein Beitrag zur Debatte um die »Verpassten Gelegenheiten« im Jahr 1952," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 35:3 (Juli 87): 349-384; Gunther Mai, "Dominanz oder Kooperation im Bündnis? Die Sicherheitspolitik der USA und der Verteidigungsbeitrag Europas 1945-1956," *Historische Zeitschrift* 246:2 (April 88): 327-364. Martin H. Folly, "Breaking the Vicious Circle: Britain, The United States, and the Genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty," *Diplomatic History* 12:1 (Winter 88):59-77 provides the most recent summary of this trend in historiography.

⁴² Karl Bower, *Deutsche Verteidigungspolitik: 1945-1963 Dokumente und Kommentare (Eine Auswahl)* (Boppard a. Rhein, 1964).

⁴³ James L. Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics* (Cambridge, 1966).

⁴⁴ Norbert Wiggershaus, "Bedrohungsvorstellen Bundeskanzler Adenauers nach Ausbruch des Korea-Kriegs," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 1/79: 79-122; Roland

Still, none of these arguments of themselves explains how these perceptions and aims overcame the opposition, were translated into political decisions, and were eventually impressed upon the voters. And the fact remains that not only was the Plevan Plan ratified by the Bundestag, but the government which signed it was re-elected by a clear, if not overwhelming, majority.⁴⁵

Why Did Adenauer Choose Adolf Heusinger and Hans Speidel?

Careful consideration of the particular circumstances leading to Adenauer's appointment of Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger as his military advisors makes this process much clearer. Both men were known to the Americans as members of the officers' resistance to Hitler. In May, 1944 Heusinger, then Director of the Wehrmacht Military Operations Branch and Deputy Chief of the General Staff, had been identified by Allen Dulles (then OSS representative in Bern) as having helped convince Chief of General Staff Zeitzler to go along with

G. Foerster et. al., *Von der Kapitulation bis zum Plevan-Plan, Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956* Bd. 1, hg. v. Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt (München, 1982); Manfred Overesch, "Senior West German Politicians and their Perception of the German Situation in Europe 1945-1949," Dietrich Staritz and Arnold Sywottek, "The International Political Situation as seen by the German Linksparteien (SPD, SED, and KPD) between 1945 and 1949," and Wilfried Loth, "German Conceptions of Europe during the Escalation of the East-West Conflict, 1945-1949," all contained in *Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany in a Postwar World 1945-1950*, ed. by Joseph Becker and Franz Knipping (Berlin/New York, 1986).

⁴⁵ Ryder, *Twentieth-Century Germany*: 503.

General Ludwig Beck's April offer to attempt an ouster of the Nazi regime in exchange for a separate peace with the Western Allies.⁴⁶ Speidel, also a member of the Beck-Goerdeler faction, had played a similar role in convincing Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, whom he had served as Chief of Staff at Rommel's personal request, to go along with the resisters' plans. Speidel had been arrested by the Gestapo following the July 20 assassination attempt, had shared a prison cell with Adenauer's future personal assistant Ernst Wirmer, and in 1945 was liberated by the French.⁴⁷ In addition, he had several other French connections dating from his 1933 appointment as military attaché in Paris, the most notable among them being André François-Poncet, French Ambassador to Germany.⁴⁸ Further, Heusinger had served as an expert and material witness for the U.S. prosecutor at Nuremberg.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, 1944 v.I); Magruder to Warren: 512-513.

⁴⁷ Peter Hoffmann, *The History of the German Resistance 1933-1945* (Cambridge, 1977): 351-354; Nelson: 26-27.

⁴⁸ Hans Speidel, *Aus unserer Zeit: Erinnerungen* (Berlin/Frankfurt a.M./Wien, 1977: 54).

⁴⁹ Allen, *Heusinger*; Joachim Krüger and Joachim Schulz, *Kriegsverbrecher Heusinger: 45 Jahre im Solde des deutschen Imperialismus* (Berlin, 1960); Hellweg Oley, *Der 20. Juli und der Fall Heusinger* (Berlin, 1960). All three of these sensational works are part of the Soviet-led outcry against Heusinger's appointment as Inspector-General of the Bundeswehr. Understandably, they make much of Heusinger's close proximity to Hitler on the day of the 20 July assassination attempt, his OKH (Army High

Both Speidel and Heusinger were intelligent, technically and tactically proficient, and had established brilliant professional reputations in performance of their highly-placed staff duties. It was therefore not surprising that the Occupation Army would attempt to benefit from their expertise, as it did from that of many ex-Wehrmacht officers.⁵⁰ At war's end, both men were quickly assigned to work under the Americans: Speidel with the Army Historical Office, Heusinger with the so-called Gehlen Organization.⁵¹ Their added reputation as Nazi resisters made the precise nature of their duties--or more specifically, Heusinger's duties--especially significant.

In 1945, the United States had no established Command) service under Jodl, and especially his operations planning of the eastern campaign and his awareness of orders directing the brutal anti-partisan activities conducted by the Waffen-SS, over whom the OKH had no direct command authority. While they do well to question the cleanliness of the hands of a man who did not initiate, but did relay such orders, they also downplay or ignore both Heusinger's ultimate dismissal by Hitler for consistently and vociferously opposing those anti-partisan policies, and his full cooperation with the Nuremberg prosecution. In any event, while charging Heusinger as a 'Nazi war-criminal', they introduce no facts which were not already known by the Allies at the original war crimes trials.

⁵⁰ Georg Meyer, "Zur Situation der deutschen Militärischen Führungsschicht im Vorfeld des Westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrages 1945-1950/51" in Foerster et.al., *Von der Kapitulation*: 674-684.

⁵¹ Speidel, *Aus unserer Zeit*: 239; Heinz Höhne and Hermann Zolling, *The General Was A Spy: The Truth About General Gehlen and His Spy Ring* (New York, 1972: 8-9, 71). (Despite the sensational title of the English translation, this is a well documented study and remains to date the definitive account of Gehlen's work.)

intelligence gathering capability in the territory controlled by its soon-to-become-intransigent Soviet allies. Therefore, when Reinhard Gehlen, the senior intelligence officer of the *Abwehr's Fremde Heere Ost* (Foreign Armies East, the directorate controlling all intelligence operation in Eastern Europe), offered to deliver wholesale to the United States his entire intelligence staff, files, and agent network--in exchange for prosecutorial immunity--William Donovan, Director of the OSS, urged and won U.S. acceptance.⁵² Gehlen had received his intelligence and staff training under Heusinger, and immediately recruited his old boss to work in this reactivated operation.⁵³ While the exact nature of the intelligence estimates developed by these men is a matter for conjecture, Speidel's have been published, and he claims to have based them upon material supplied him by Gehlen, and to have discussed them later with his old friend and colleague Heusinger.⁵⁴ Speidel and Heusinger had been close since their 1929 General Staff College days.⁵⁵ It is reasonable to assume that Speidel's

⁵² Höhne: 59-62; Meyer: 684; Leonard Mosley, *Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network* (New York, 1978: 229-236).

⁵³ Höhne: 71.

⁵⁴ Roland G. Foerster, "Innenpolitische Aspekte der Sicherheit Westdeutschlands 1947-1950" in Foerster et.al., *Von der Kapitulation: 414; Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit: 249, 255.*

⁵⁵ Ibid.: 41.

estimates were not substantively different from those passed to the Americans by the Gehlen Organization.

The first of these, formally prepared in June, 1948, was in essence a standard military intelligence force-ratio comparison. It demonstrated that the massive numbers of Soviet troops and tanks within the occupied eastern areas could not be countered with conventional Western Allied forces remaining in Europe. In this comparison, it also assumed hostile, expansionist Soviet intentions.⁵⁶ Such an extrapolation of intentions from capabilities is to be expected from a military intelligence estimate, especially one prepared by senior officers who had recently completed a hard-fought campaign against the forces in question. To the eyes of German veterans of the eastern battlefields, any Soviet military presence must have appeared hostile--the Soviets had already been defined by war experience as 'the' enemy. The significance is that, at the time, there was no non-German intelligence service available to provide a competing estimate of Soviet intentions, rather than capabilities--and any Soviet action thereafter would thus come to be interpreted in light of those original estimates.⁵⁷ It is not then surprising that those

⁵⁶ Ibid.: 454-465.

⁵⁷ The OSS was disbanded in 1945; the CIA activated in 1948. Significantly, it was headed by Allen Dulles, but required several years to gain influence and reputation.

American voices which had always decried any attempt to deflate the Soviet Bolshevik threat to Western Europe should have gained in strength.

Strongest among these had been Donovan himself; his emphasis however, had been tempered by both President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Allen Dulles, neither of whom shared his uncompromising attitude. When Roosevelt died, Donovan was determined both to save the OSS and to press his anti-Soviet stance upon presidential successor Harry S. Truman, and he attempted to use Gehlen to further both these aims. His plans backfired. On September 20th, 1945, the day Truman signed the Executive Order disbanding the OSS, Reinhard Gehlen and the remnants of his staff landed in Washington.⁵⁸ By 1946, after listening to several of Gehlen's debriefings and being depressed by rising reports from the field of Russian atrocities and 'anti-democratic' and 'politically intolerant' actions, Allen Dulles became disillusioned and began to shift his support away from the Soviets--as he later argued to his brother Secretary of State John Foster. He agreed that the U.S. should accept Gehlen's offer. But both Dulles and Donovan were outmaneuvered by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. Gehlen and his service were accepted and fully funded--but attached to Army G-2, not to the tiny Central Intelligence Group

⁵⁸ Mosley, *Dulles*: 236; Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the CIA* (Washington, 1981: 269).

which was activated in the summer of 1946. Gehlen and his staff returned to Germany and began work under Lucius D. Clay, the American Proconsul. The effect of the Military Governor's reliance upon raw, unanalyzed Gehlen-Organization-generated estimates became clear in the March, 1948 "war scare", when the Army's panicked assessment of Soviet intentions following the February coup in Czechoslovakia won out over the more considered evaluation of the newly-established Central Intelligence Agency.⁵⁹

Against this backdrop, on 23 May, 1948 a group of Southwestern Germans met quietly at Prince Max zu Fürstenberg's Schloss Heiligenberg south of Ulm in Württemberg. This 'Laupheimer Circle' included Württemberg-Hohenzollern Deputy State President, Justice Minister, and future *Bundestag* President Carlo Schmidt (SPD); former Württemberg-Baden Minister of Culture, FDP Chairman and future *Bundespräsident* Theodor Heuss; Württemberg-Hohenzollern State President and CDU Chairman, and future Baden-Württemberg Minister-President Gebhard Müller; Württemberg-Hohenzollern State Finance Secretary Paul Binder (CDU); Württemberg-Hohenzollern economics advisor and Deputy Minister of the Interior, University of Tübingen Lecturer, and future historian and Professor of Political Science Theodor Eschenburg;

⁵⁹ Mosley: 227-229, 237-243; Troy: 269; Meyer, ref. fn. 50: 684.

University of Freiburg Historian Gerhard Ritter; Frankfurt lawyer and former Prussian Finance Minister Otto Klepper; journalist and future *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* co-editor Benno Reifenberg and his colleague, *Die Gegenwart* co-editor Friedrich Sieburg; political scientist, former publisher, and future *Christ und Welt* editor Klaus Mehnert; Baron von Stauffenberg; Margrave Berthold von Baden, and Adenauer's close associate Otto Lenz (CDU), among others.⁶⁰

This influential group had met partly out of genuine concern for the future security of their homeland. At the time, Western Allied contingency plans called for the drawing of a defensive line at the Rhein--leaving Württemberg, along with most of Germany, totally undefended should the Soviet Union choose to attack. Speidel, invited at the behest of his old friend Württemberg-Hohenzollern Minister Eberhard Wildermuth, offered the group his technical assessment of the military situation and recommendations for the reestablishment of a German armed service, integrated with that of the Western Allies, which would make possible establishing defensive lines further east.⁶¹

Speidel's views were no secret, and predated this

⁶⁰ Speidel: 244-245; Roland G. Foerster, "Innenpolitische Aspekte der Sicherheit Westdeutschlands 1945-1950" in Foerster et. al., *Von der Kapitulation: 1945-1950*; Eschenburg, *Jahre der Besatzung*: 589, 595, 597, 601-604, 606, 627; Wettig, *Entmilitarisierung*: 244.

⁶¹ Foerster: 433-434; Speidel: 238-250.

invitation. After the Ministers from the Soviet Zone staged a walkout of the Munich Minister Presidents' conference in June, 1947, Wildermuth had asked Speidel to apply a military-technical analysis to the situation to overthrow "pacifist illusions".⁶² Speidel had also discussed these ideas with many others, including Carlo Schmidt, Württemberg Bishop Theophil Wurm, and faculty discussion groups at the University of Tübingen.⁶³ In addressing the Laupheimer Circle, Speidel was lending technical detail to what was already for that audience the prevalent world view of a Russian threat and necessity for a West European orientation.⁶⁴ Indeed, his position *vis-a-vis* the circle was truly that of a 'favored son': Speidel was himself a Swabian, educated in Stuttgart, and his father had been a member of the Tübingen faculty.⁶⁵

Speidel was called back the following month to present the June, 1948 memorandum, which he had reinforced with Gehlen's material. It was after this meeting, following which Speidel's presentation was apparently blessed, that his work reached the attention of Konrad Adenauer's staff. This was done at the recommendation of another of Speidel's old acquaintances,

⁶² Foerster: 414.

⁶³ Speidel: 235-244.

⁶⁴ Overesch, ref. fn. 44: 119-124.

⁶⁵ Speidel: 13-20.

Colonel Truman Smith. These two had met when Smith was American Military Attaché in Berlin, and reestablished contact after the war through the Lindbergh family, with whom they were mutually friendly. At Speidel's invitation, Charles Lindbergh attended one of the Tübingen panel sessions and addressed the student body on security issues; within days Speidel's memorandum was in the hands of Alexander Böker, one of Adenauer's co-workers.⁶⁶

On December 7, ten days before Adenauer, as CDU Chairman and member of the Parliamentary Council, was to meet with the Western Military Governors to discuss their requirements for a draft constitution, Speidel was contacted by Rolf Pauls, assistant to Adenauer's foreign affairs advisor Herbert Blankenhorn. Pauls had served under Speidel in France, and when asked by Adenauer "if he knew of any former Generals competent to address security issues", immediately named his old boss; then asked Speidel whether Speidel could be prepared to brief his position to Blankenhorn and Adenauer on the 14th. Speidel did so, and after the NATO pact was ratified the following April, he and Heusinger were jointly commissioned by Pauls to consider the military implications of the alliance for Germany.⁶⁷

In light of this, it can be said that in the

⁶⁶ Speidel: 244, 252; Foerster: 433-435.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

strictest sense, Adenauer did not "choose" Speidel and Heusinger at all; they were offered to him. He was not without other offers. By 1950, British High Commissioner Lord Robertson, displeased with Adenauer's reliance upon Speidel and Heusinger, suggested that Adenauer appoint noble, Prussian Count Gerhard von Schwerin as military advisor. What Adenauer referred to deprecatingly as the "von Schwerin experiment" did not last long: the reactionary, outspoken, tactless von Schwerin leaked West German security intentions to the press. Adenauer wanted stringent control of 'public education' regarding these issues. He fired his 'advisor' immediately, showing that he neither felt it necessary to bend to British pressure inconsistent with his own interests, nor was willing for a moment to tolerate insubordination on the part of the leadership of his fledgeling military.⁶⁸ However, this event may have had even deeper significance.

In order to understand that significance, one would wish to make clear whether it was Speidel's acceptability to the Württembergers, or Speidel and Heusinger's mutual acceptability to the Americans (and, in the case of Speidel, to the French) which bore greater weight in Adenauer's ultimate decision. Like Adenauer himself, of the Laupheimer Circle Heuss, Wildermuth, Wurm, and Eschenburg were all included on the December, 1944 Allied

⁶⁸ Rautenberg, in Foerster, et. al.: 786; Nelson: 26.

Expeditionary Force "White List" of persons in Germany believed to be anti-Nazi or non-Nazi, and Adenauer was known for capitalizing upon this 'clean bill of health' without making much distinction between those who had been genuinely anti-National Socialist, and those who had merely (as stated in the White List entry for his long time friend, Cologne banker Robert Pferdemenges) "made only absolutely necessary concessions to Nazis."⁶⁹ Had he genuinely wished to avoid incorporating officers with questionable political leadings--that is, questionable in terms of their having slavishly executed National Socialist war aims--he could have chosen from officers who did not have any connection to these particular men: officers who had been recognized by their peers as 'the cream of the *Wehrmacht*'; who had been Soviet, rather than Western, prisoners of war; he could have chosen officers who had joined the German Officers' League in Moscow and the eastern communist-socialist resistance efforts of the Free Germany National Committee.⁷⁰ In short, he could have chosen from officers who, unlike Heusinger (and behind him Gehlen), bore no trace of responsibility for wittingly waging aggressive war, relaying genocidal anti-partisan orders to the *Waffen-SS*, or conducting the

⁶⁹ Henric L. Wuermeling, *Die Weisse Liste: Umbruch der politischen Kultur in Deutschland 1945* (Berlin, 1981): 282-285, 291.

⁷⁰ Hoffmann, "Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg": 633; *History of the German Resistance*: 232.

intelligence operations that made generation of those orders possible--actions which, in the cases of other officers, had been prosecuted as criminal. Consideration of the context of Speidel's rise (especially as compared to von Schwerin's fall) provides some enlightening clues as to why, beyond Superpower interests, he would not select from among these alternatives.

*Continuity and Change in the Politics of The German Army
1918-1950*

Speidel and Heusinger's views toward the Soviet Union represent but one part of a world view these men shared and which long predated the war experience. The full expression of this socio-political outlook was articulated by Wilhelm Groener beginning in 1918. Like his fellow Swabian Speidel, Groener was pro-French, anti-Prussian, pro-American, anti-Soviet, vaguely pro-republican, and stringently anti-communist. He urgently supported calm and order; was willing to work with the socialists, but ultimately preferred the conservative anti-liberal policies of the right-wing Catholic Centrists as represented by Heinrich Brüning, the last Chancellor of the Weimar Republic.⁷¹

⁷¹ Craig, *Politics*: 347, 349-350, 361, 363, 365-367, 369-370, 373, 436, 438. See also Sebastian Haffner, *Failure of a Revolution: Germany 1918-1919* (Chicago, 1969) and Gerhard Rakenius, *Wilhelm Groener als erster Generalquartiermeister: Die Politik der Obersten Heeresleitung 1918/19* (Boppard a. Rhein, 1974).

From the confusion following the monarchy's fall in 1918, the Majority Socialist leader Friedrich Ebert emerged as Chancellor of the newly declared Republic. Groener pledged him the army's support--a decision which possibly represented majority opinion within the ranks, but was opposed by a large faction of the officer corps.⁷² The strength and nature of that opposition became apparent during the 1920 Kapp Putsch. Plotters used the government's decision to deactivate two elite brigades outside Berlin as an excuse to march on the capital. The East Prussian putschists did not actually command significant forces, but to the shock of both Groener and Reichswehr Minister Gustav Noske, senior army commanders represented by Hans von Seeckt refused to commit local troops to suppress these diehard monarchists.⁷³ In comparison to Groener, the Prussian Seeckt was not only ambivalent about republicanism, but was pro-Russian and anti-French. Rather than sharing Groener's view that the legitimacy of military power ultimately rested upon the legitimacy of a legally constituted government, Seeckt claimed that the army was above politics and constituted a state within the eternal state, not to be confused with the transitory government in power.⁷⁴

⁷² *Ibid.*: 348.

⁷³ *Ibid.*: 376-377.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*: 388, 409, 412, 420.

Against Seeckt, only Chief of Army Command Walter Reinhardt unambiguously supported Groener and the Social Democratic cabinet. His stand is significant, for like Groener he was a native son of Württemberg. Reinhardt's compatriots, the regimental commanders of Stuttgart's Military District V, stood fast along with him--so it was to Stuttgart that Ebert and his ministers fled. Reinhardt was installed as Commander-in-Chief of the District when Speidel, then serving as a young aide-de-camp, first met him. Speidel later remembered him as a true "Swabian democrat".⁷⁵

This early Württemberger stand against the Prussian monarchists was followed by Groener's later spirited fight, from his position as Reichswehr Minister, against the National Socialists. Beginning in 1928, he struggled once more against members of his own officer corps fraternity; again, his adversaries were reactionary Prussians, this time led by Groener's own protégé Kurt von Schleicher. Groener did not meet with success. By 1932, Schleicher had forced his resignation.⁷⁶

Speidel very clearly saw himself as the inheritor of an exceptionally 'democratic' army tradition. He was vague about precisely what he meant by this, but the troops of Württemberg, he felt, were always especially close to the people, and among the pantheon of Prussian

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*: 377, 379; Speidel: 32-34.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*: 428-453.

generals, Speidel looked only to the liberal reformers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.⁷⁷ In his time, the officer corps of Württemberg was the inheritor of a far more egalitarian tradition than that of Prussia: in the late nineteenth century, when Prussian officers were drawn overwhelmingly from the nobility, two-fifths to three-quarters of those of Württemberg were of middle-class origin.⁷⁸ By 1909, that figure had increased: in some engineer and artillery units, to one hundred per cent.⁷⁹

Speidel's assessment notwithstanding, the world view characteristic of these officers cannot be deduced solely from their Swabian origins: it was shared by many Rheinland Catholic Centrists, including Adenauer himself.⁸⁰ However, the potential for amalgamating officers of this tradition with a base of political support outside their own corps had not been realized before Hitler attained power in 1933. The National Socialists banned the Center Party, along with the Social Democrats and other minor parties, and subsequently ejected all Catholic Centrists from public office.⁸¹ Adenauer for example, then Lord Mayor, was

⁷⁷ Speidel: 30, 41, 44.

⁷⁸ Demeter, *The German Army*: 46.

⁷⁹ F.C. Endres, *The Social Structure and Corresponding Ideologies of the German Officers' Corps Before the World War* (New York, 1937): 19.

⁸⁰ Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik*: 425-442.

driven from Cologne. The following year, while hiding in Berlin, he was to witness a brutal object lesson in 'civil management' of military forces: Schleicher's murder at the hands of Himmler's SS during the "Night of the Long Knives".⁸²

Some time would pass before concerted opposition to Hitler's government would arise from within the officer corps--but when it did, one of its leaders was both a Württemberger and General of Artillery, Ludwig Beck. Although his formal efforts at organizing an effective opposition date from his resignation following the 1938 Czech crisis, Beck first expressed his displeasure in 1935, and in 1937 made his pro-French and anti-Nazi position clear to his younger relative Hans Speidel, whom he recruited for the resistance.⁸³ In this context, it is not at all surprising that Beck (and, for that matter, Adenauer) had observed Schleicher's fate without comment.⁸⁴ Repugnant though he found the National Socialists, he could hardly have been expected to mourn the passing of the man who had brought the downfall of the very people he proposed to defend. In the following

⁸¹ Ryder, *Twentieth-Century Germany*: 304-307.

⁸² Paul Weymar, *Adenauer: His Authorized Biography* (New York, 1957): 107.

⁸³ Speidel: 70-71; Peter Hoffmann, *The History of the German Resistance 1933-1945* (Cambridge, 1977): 38; Harold C. Deutsch, *Hitler and His Generals: The Hidden Crisis January-June 1938* (Minneapolis, 1974): 418.

⁸⁴ Here I disagree with Hoffmann, *History of the German Resistance*: 26.

years, the lines demarcating the East-oriented Prussians from the West-oriented Swabians became clearer, for even when united in opposition to Hitler, they were so divided between themselves that Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg could not bring himself to tell Beck that he had shifted his allegiance to the opposing view. Beck's search for American assurances that if he succeeded in overthrowing Hitler's regime, his own Western-Front forces would be allowed to redeploy against the Russians in the east, echoed Gröner's self-deluded 1918 optimism that France and Great Britain, backed by the United States, were on the verge of requesting German assistance to launch a counter-revolutionary war against the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union.⁸⁵

In 1918, Groener had offered to wed this non-noble, educated middle-class, West-oriented army faction to the service of Ebert's Socialist government. However, at the time neither had possessed the political wisdom necessary to consummate the union. Groener had failed to understand the deep disunity within his own officer corps: he assumed loyalty from officers whose social origins, world view, and political ambitions were vastly different from his own. And Ebert, representing a party profoundly ambivalent toward re-institutionalizing a force capable of prosecuting offensive war, had no

⁸⁵ Hoffmann, "Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg": 634-637, 647; Craig: 364-365.

experience with military leadership. He foisted too much responsibility onto his Defense Minister, and did not take care to ensure that the senior generals were in fact under his control. Rather than immediately helping Groener to consolidate command authority, he countenanced Noske's increasing use of the most reactionary and least legitimate elements available--and compounded the error by confirming Seeckt as Commander in Chief of the *Reichswehr*.⁸⁶ Adenauer, and the political coalition he represented, did not repeat this error.

*Power Politics, Command Authority, and Military Ideology
in the Founding of the West German Federal Republic*

When Hans Speidel arrived at Konrad Adenauer's office in 1948, he did so not merely as the representative of a very small faction of the officer corps, but as a "technical expert" who carried strong, broad-based regional backing. This was important, for Adenauer had a number of political needs at that moment.

First, he needed an issue which would quickly unite the seemingly intractable Western Allies and make drafting a constitution possible. The Americans were pushing for particular formulations of federalism in the proposed Basic Law; the British wished a more centralized government with a socialist economy and nationalized

⁸⁶ Craig: 379-381.

industry; the French were particularly concerned to protect their security interests and permanently 'demilitarize' the Saarland, Rhineland, and industrial Ruhr. Adenauer not only wanted a quick return of sovereignty to his country, but he needed speedy elections. Without both, he reasoned, he could not place the country on a solid financial footing--and he was sure that continuing widespread misery would cost votes lost to the socialists and communists.

Second, Adenauer needed an issue which would provide him a working coalition. Win or lose, he wanted backing for his economic policies--and related to these, he needed an issue which would help him to end industrial dismantling and payment of war reparations. His longer term goal was to produce economic prosperity--not only for reasons already stated, but also to gain CDU popularity for subsequent elections.

Finally, Adenauer needed to secure the loyalty of all the potentially destabilizing forces of the right which had so quickly undermined the Weimar government: the Hannoverian 'blood and soil' loyalists of the German Party (DP), so many of whom had flocked to the National Socialist banner; the nationalist, Pan-german, authoritarian and big-business remnants of the Harzburg Front gathered under the heterogeneous FDP; the noisily *völkisch* interregnist elements of the BHE; as well as the fractious members of the Waffen SS and Wehrmacht, whose

advocacy organs demanded rehabilitation and 'fair' postwar treatment for their wartime-draftee membership.⁸⁷ While he found the 'materialistic atheism' of the Socialist Democrats abhorrent, he did not fear them as a 'loyal opposition', for like the CDU they could not command a majority vote. Since the SPD would under no circumstance form a coalition with the right-wing parties, even if the CDU were to lose by a narrow margin, the SPD would be forced to take on Adenauer's party in an ensuing coalition government.

Thus, Speidel's memorandum provided a solution to many problems. American attention--thanks at least in part to Gehlen--was already focused on the Soviet Union; Adenauer was convinced that the British and French would follow suit. If the Western Powers believed that the Soviet Union posed a greater threat to European security than Germany, then they would consider a defensive alliance. If Germany were to contribute to such an alliance, then the country could hardly be expected to go on with dismantling and reparations. If dismantling could be stopped, then economic recovery could begin. Germany was poor; it was not underdeveloped.

Ultimately, these policies would appeal to the BHE; the refugees had suffered much at the hands of the Russians. The economic and business interests interests

⁸⁷ Tauber, "Renaizification of Restoration?," *Beyond Eagle and Swastika*, 879-936.

of the FDP would be overjoyed with resulting West-oriented trade policy. And finally, all those who had either actively supported or merely 'gone along with' the National Socialists would be glad of diversion of attention away from their own past crimes, whether of commission or omission.⁸⁸

Adenauer claims to have foreseen all this; in any case, he was not disappointed in his predictions. By August, 1949 NATO was formed; the Federal constitution was ratified with provisions allowing the Republic to contribute to an international security force; and Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union had emerged victorious in national elections on the strength of its liberal-economic, pro-Western, pro-Christian platform.⁸⁹

Within weeks, Adenauer appointed Ernst Wirmer and Hans Speidel as his personal advisers. This was followed by his formal 1950 appointment of Speidel and Heusinger as military Berater to Defense Minister-to-be Theodor Blank.⁹⁰ In promoting these men to key positions, Adenauer was taking the first step toward consolidating governmental control over future armed forces. However, his reform measures did not stop with ensuring the

⁸⁸ Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs 1945-1953* (Chicago, 1966): 42-266.

⁸⁹ Ryder: 497-503.

⁹⁰ Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg, "Zur Standortbestimmung für künftige deutsche Streitkräfte," in Foerster, et. al.: 786.

devotion and kindly intentions of his top leadership. They included structural changes in the chain of command authority, of which two were especially significant. The first was in the wartime power of Supreme Command, which was invested in the Chief Executive--the Chancellor--and not in the Head of State--the President. This completed the trend begun in 1918: the position of commander-in-chief had then moved from Kaiser to President; under Hitler the positions of President, Chancellor, and Commander-in-Chief were consolidated; and finally under the Basic Law the transition to parliamentary control was achieved.⁹¹

The second major change reflected a trend begun under Bismarck--that of federalization of the armed forces. In 1868 the armies of the separate German states were forcibly subordinated to the Army of the Confederation. The resulting command structure rendered either a separate attack against Prussia, or resistance to the Emperor's war declarations, virtually impossible. In the *Reichswehr* the separate armies were eliminated, and traditional units were totally immersed in a unified command authority, although they did continue to recruit from and serve within their own regional bases. In the *Wehrmacht* these distinctions were obliterated: soldiers

⁹¹ Telford Taylor, *Sword and Swastika: Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich* (New York, 1952): 383-405; Trevor-Nevitt Dupuy, *A Genius for War: the German Army and General Staff 1807-1945* (Englewood Cliffs, 1977): 315-327.

were recruited and served without regard to their homes of origin. Finally, after meticulous consideration and planning by a carefully selected and vetted group of ex-generals (including Speidel and Heusinger), the Bundeswehr--a unified all-German force--was federated into the NATO structure, making it impossible for Germany to launch any declaration of war either against or separate from other members of the alliance, without first rupturing this relationship and thus providing long-in-advance warning of aggressive intentions.⁹²

As a pair, Speidel and Heusinger represented the strengths of the CDU itself: the extroverted, diplomatic, well-educated, devout Catholic--Speidel, contrasted to the reserved, taciturn, technocratic, devout Lutheran--Heusinger. Speidel, the son of a Swabian forestry expert; Heusinger, the son of a Hannoverian minister; both working for Adenauer, the son of a Cologne District Court Secretary; all highly regarded by the French for being rational and by the Americans for being Nazi resisters; and all supported politically and in some instances financially by Cologne and Stuttgart bankers.⁹³ It was a mini-demographic profile of an upper-middle-

⁹² Dietrich Genschel, *Wehrreform und Reaktion: Die Vorbereitung der Inneren Führung 1951-1956* (Hamburg, 1972): 347-352; Nelson: 105-107.

⁹³ *Ibid.*: 755-878. Pferdemenges lent both Adenauer and the CDU considerable assistance both during and after the war; their association dated to Adenauer's early years the civil service, when his banking firm first managed Adenauer's portfolio.

class constellation which finally--if by some reckonings a hundred years too late--had come to power.

That Adenauer himself never genuinely feared a Soviet attack, but rather recognised this incorporation of a 'new elite' in the officer corps as part of a political process, was to become clear in the snail's pace with which his government actually proceeded with rearmament. With ultimate irony, fully ten years after the *Bundesrepublik* was to have completed the fielding of its contribution to the NATO security force structure, the *Bundeswehr* came under fire from the SPD and left-liberal press for its demonstrated lack of preparedness during NATO exercises. Adenauer commented upon the supposed shortage of manpower and equipment 'essential' for West German security with customary wry wit. "If you need more brigades," he said with a wave of the hand, "just pin some more of those little flags on the map."⁹⁴ The nearly fifty-year-old threat of Bolshevist revolution and Soviet invasion had long since accomplished its purpose; CDU aims had been met. Adenauer had been

⁹⁴ The aftermath of this "Spiegel Affair" resulted in Adenauer's retirement and Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss's resignation, although not because of this comment. Strauss, a second-term cocession to the Bavarian CSU who was not cut of the same diplomatic cloth as his predecessor Theodor Blank, handled investigation of allegations that *Der Spiegel's* article was based upon classified information in a blatantly ham-handed fashion, which left him open to charges that the government had adopted "Gestapo tactics." Ronald F. Bunn, *German Politics and the Spiegel Affair: A Case Study of the Bonn System* (Baton Rouge, 1968): 10-36, 187-215

Chancellor for fourteen years, and his generals--Speidel and Heusinger--had served him faithfully for the full term. Additional troops were to him irrelevant.

CONCLUSION: *The Military Polity*

What are we to conclude from all this? That ex-Wehrmacht generals 'caused' the United States to adopt an anti-Soviet policy, thus fueling the Cold War? This is certainly too simplistic. That Adenauer picked only 'safe', 'clean', 'democratic', reformed anti-Nazis, and thus purged the armed forces of any dangerous tradition? That is certainly too naive. That *Wehrmacht* alte-Nazis, such as Heusinger and Gehlen, infiltrated the new officer corps and there linger, preparing the coming of a Fourth Reich? That is ridiculously alarmist. That Adenauer's reconstruction of an armed force 'proves' his conservative authoritarianism? That ignores the obvious influence upon these events of persons who are manifestly neither conservative nor authoritarian. If the question, "Why did Konrad Adenauer choose Adolf Heusinger and Hans Speidel to be his military advisors?" really were a good refinement of the question, "Why was Germany rearmed?", we would not be left so flat in our attempt to draw conclusions about the real meaning and nature of the continuities across *Stunde Null* as represented by these men. In fact, it is not ultimately a very good

refinement. It tells us more about tactics than about strategy. It reveals a bit of the decision-making 'undertaken by men doing a great many things in a great hurry', to paraphrase what Micheal Foot calls A.J.P. Taylor's "non-theory" of history. At best, it shows us that at the moment of their selection, Adenauer's generals were merely useful in helping him to solve many of his critical problems: guaranteeing success of his own political party; establishing (West) German sovereignty; promoting economic recovery; actual security.

Still, that this is the case is of itself revealing--perhaps not in terms of grand theory, but certainly in terms of the middle ground upon which debate about the *Bundeswehr* has raged. To restate the case simply, the problem with analysis to date is that it has focused upon whether or not there were ex-Nazis in the *Bundeswehr*, and upon whether the *Bundeswehr* is or is not therefore a successor to monarchist Prussian military tradition. That Adenauer may have perceived another, non-noble, non-Prussian, primarily southwestern German tradition upon which to draw has not been explored fully--and so to do is beyond the scope of this paper. Without such a thorough sociological, institutional, and biographical exploration, no firm conclusion can be reached as to whether that tradition was inherently 'more democratic' than the Prussian; what sort of 'democracy' it may or may not have represented; or whether the

inposition of that alternate tradition upon the ideology of the *Bundeswehr* of itself had a positive impact upon 'the progress' (or lack of progress) of 'democracy' in Germany.

What the answer to this question does tell us is that to formulate an analytical framework which distinguishes, to quote one title, 'the military, militarism, and the polity' as conceptual entities drives a misleading wedge between 'the military' and 'the polity'. For 'the polity' coincides in form and limits with the maximum spread of the institutional framework within which power and authority are distributed and public regulation obtains. Even without the details of the internal discussion within Adenauer's own circles, what we see in this short consideration of the tactical maneuverings which led to Speidel's and Heusinger's appointments--maneuverings which were intrinsic to the establishment of postwar institutions for public regulation--is that in the sense defined 'the polity' includes 'the military'; that 'the military' itself is a mechanism of 'the polity', not an alternative to it or a force outside of it. To come to terms with the 'meaning' of the *Bundeswehr*'s continuation of a military presence after 1945, we must first unite this erroneous division, and examine more closely the existance eof divisions cross-cutting 'the polity', which may be represented in divisions within 'the military' itself.

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